1、20 JFQ/issue 49,2d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.eduThroughout the last 6 years of the war on terror,which has seen U.S.Army units deploy two and three times for year-long(or more)combat operations,the joint com-munity has been unable to provide the cov-erage of unmanned aircraft systems(UAS)required to
2、 support tactical operations.Commanders plan operations based on known reliable resources.Joint UAS are fre-quently not allocated to division and brigade combat team(BCT)operations due to a lack of sufficient numbers of systems and higher priority theater,joint task force,joint force air component c
3、ommand(JFACC),or other government agency support mission requirements.When divisions and BCTs do receive joint UAS coverage based upon an allocation model,the support is frequently cut short,the supported tactical commander is unable to dynamically redirect the platform/sensor,or the unmanned aircra
4、ft By J e f f r e y K a p p e n M a nsystem breaks station just as ground forces have begun to develop the situation.It is imperative that units in physical contact with the enemy have the continuous sensor coverage needed to dominate and win the engagement.Army commanders at all tactical levels(div
